




Publishing Trajectories: A Study on Privacy Protection

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
October 14, 2025

Motivation


“Privacy is one the biggest problems in this new electronic age”- Andy Grove (former INTEL Ceo)



Statistical Disclosure Control




Statistical Disclosure Control



Model

Trajectories

Raw Trajectories




$$T = (x_1, y_1, t_1) \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow (x_n, y_n, t_n)$$

Semantic Trajectories



POI


Properties



Privacy Notions in SDC

Syntactic Notions


Database properties




- k -anonymity
- l -diversity
- t -closeness
- Attribute Privacy

Semantic Notions

ϵ -differential privacy




Differential Privacy




ϵ -Differential Privacy

A randomized algorithm M is said to be ϵ -differentially private if for all neighboring databases D, D' and all $S \subseteq \text{Range}(M)$,

$$\mathbb{P}\{M(D) \in S\} \leq e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}\{M(D') \in S\}.$$




Differential Privacy



Privacy Loss (by observing r)

$$\mathcal{L}_{M(D) || M(D')}^r = \ln \left(\frac{\mathbb{P}(M(D) = r)}{\mathbb{P}(M(D') = r)} \right)$$



Sensitivity

ℓ_1 -sensitivity

The ℓ_1 -sensitivity of a function $f: \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ is:

$$\Delta(f) := \max_{\|D, D'\|_1=1} \|f(D) - f(D')\|_1$$

UNBOUNDED SENSITIVITIES!!

outliers and huge noise

S-O-T-A analysis

Privacy Notion	Classification	Ref.	Correct DP notion	Laplace	Considers time	Unb. loc. univ.	Realism	Total data preserv.	SM: <i>Euclidean</i> SM: <i>Hausdorff</i> SM: <i>Other</i> Other					<i>Loc. visit counts</i> <i>Freq. seq.</i> <i>Spatial density</i> Other				Realism assurance			
				Exponential					Close data preserv.					Statistics preserv.							
				Mech.					Properties			Utility Metrics									
ϵ -DP*	Noisy counts	Exploration tree	[107]		●	○	✗	✓	✗	●	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●			
ϵ -DP			[15, 16]		●	○	✗	✗	✗	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	○	○	○		
			[30]		●	○	✗	✗	✗	○	○	○	○	●	●	○	○	○	○		
		Sequence tree	[123]	✗	●	○	✗	✗	✗	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	○		
			[121]	✗	●	○	✗	✗	✗	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
			[117]	✗	●	○	✗	✗	✗	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	○		
			Trajectory count	[120]	✗	●	○	✗	✓	✓	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
		Tree + Markov	Clustering	Random centroid	[10]	✗	●	○	✗	✓	✗	○	●	○	○	○	○	●	○	○	
		k -means			[19, 57]	✗	●	●	✗	✓	✗	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
					[70]	✗	●	●	✗	✓	✗	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Hilbert curves		[54]			✗	●	●	✗	✓	✗	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	●	○	
Universal clustering		[122]			✗	●	○	✗	✓	✗	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
$(0, \delta)$ -DP	Sampling + interpolation		[91]		○	○	✗	✓	✗	○	●	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	○		
ϵ -LDP	Perturbation		[24]		○	●	✓	✓	✓	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	○		

Privacy Limitations

Inherent properties of trajectory data

Correlation
leads to
filtering attacks
&
physical models
attacks
&
fake trajectory
detection

Problems of current proposals


streaming context

Bayesian
inference

not all dimensions
are
protected

semantics
attribute
disclosure

Wrong proofs
& sensitivities



Utility limitations

Inherent properties of trajectory data

Sparseness

leads to
Unavoidable
data lost
&
high sensitivities

High
dimensionality

Problems of current proposals

Impossible
trajectories

Small universe
of locations

Utility metrics
are not
representative

Weird trajectory
patterns

Ignoring
the temporal
dimension



Stops are removed

Conclusions and Future Research

