

Balancing Privacy and Utility in Correlated Data: A Study of Bayesian Differential Privacy

VLDB, September 2nd, 2025
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PRIVACY
AND SECURITY



Motivation

Differential Privacy fails to measure privacy leakage under correlation





Empirically confirmed




Figure: Humphries et al. 2023 MIA attack breaks DP guarantees.



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






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Dependencies among data records are present in most of real world scenarios.





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
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
New enhanced notion: Bayesian Differential **Privacy**



Bayesian Differential Privacy (BDP)

Bayesian DP leakage


$$\mathrm{BDPL}_{(K,i)} = \sup_{x_i, x_i', \mathbf{x}_K, \mathcal{S}} \ln \frac{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}[Y \in \mathcal{S} \mid \mathbf{X}_K = \mathbf{x}_K, X_i = x_i]}{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}[Y \in \mathcal{S} \mid \mathbf{X}_K = \mathbf{x}_K, X_i = x_i']}, \text{ then } \varepsilon = \sup_{K, i} \mathrm{BDPL}_{(K, i)}.$$



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Bayesian Differential Privacy (BDP)

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$$BDPL_{(K,i)} = \sup_{x_i, x_i', \mathbf{x}_K, S} \ln \frac{Pr_{\mathcal{M}}[Y \in S \mid \mathbf{X}_K = \mathbf{x}_K, X_i = x_i]}{Pr_{\mathcal{M}}[Y \in S \mid \mathbf{X}_K = \mathbf{x}_K, X_i = x_i']}, \text{ then } \varepsilon = \sup_{K, i} BDPL_{(K,i)}.$$

.Privacy_____

- Effective measure and resistance to correlation-based attacks.
- ✓ Instance of Pufferfish framework.
- Good properties: post-processing & composition.

Utility

- ➤ Computationally intractable methods (computing the Wasserstein distance).
- ➤ Poor utility (methods based on group privacy).
- ★ Limited applicability (lazy, binary, stationary Markov chains).



Our Research Question

Can we reduce utility loss while still retaining the privacy guarantees of BDP?

Our methodology: Understanding how DP leakage relates to BDP leakage:

 ε -DP \Rightarrow ??-BDP.



Against arbitrary correlations it is impossible

Kifer and Machanavajjhala 2014: Pufferfish (including BDP) ∧ ⇒ Free-lunch Privacy ⇒ No utility. arbitrary correlation

We express this in term of (α, β) -accuracy: $0 \le \beta < \frac{1}{e^{\epsilon}+1}$ and any target query f, then $\alpha > \frac{1}{2} \max_{D,D'} |f(D) - f(D')|$.

```
1 - \beta = Confidence \alpha = Error, interval radius with confidence 1 - \beta.
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




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Few Correlated Records, Same Disaster

Our result (informal)

Privacy decreases linearly proportional to number of correlated records:

$$\varepsilon$$
-DP $\Rightarrow m\varepsilon$ -BDP

How does it impact utility?




Figure: For the same confidence level, the upper bound on the query error α increases sharply.



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


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Conclusion:

We need to target specific correlation models π to obtain utility

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


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New strategy

Our goal

Adjust the noise of DP mechanisms to obtain useful BDP mechanisms.

Assumption: The attacker does not have more knowledge about π than the data curator.



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Multivariate Gaussian

Markov Chains



Multivariate Gaussian Correlation (Theoretical Results)

Main Result (Informal)

- Let \mathcal{M} be an $\varepsilon \ell_1$ -private mechanism,
- input data drawn from a multivariate Gaussian distribution
- Arr $\rho(m-2)$ < 1 is the maximum correlation coefficient.

Then, using clipping as preprocessing step, $c_l(D)_i = \max(a, \min(b, D_i))$, we obtain \mathcal{M}_l satisfying

$$\mathrm{BDPL}(\mathcal{M}_I) \leq \left(\frac{m^2}{4(\frac{1}{\rho}-m+2)} + 1 \right) M \varepsilon.$$

where M is the diameter of the interval I = [a, b]



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- $\mathcal{M} \varepsilon \ell_1 \Rightarrow \mathcal{M}_I$ is $M\varepsilon$ -DP.
- Using clipping as preprocessing step is a common technique to bound the sensitivity of DP queries.

Multivariate Gaussian Correlation (Impact on Real Databases)

- Theoretical Utility Metric: (α, β) -accuracy, i.e., $\Pr[|q(D) \mathcal{M}(q(D))| \ge \alpha] \le \beta$. Specifically, $\beta = 0.05$, i.e., 95% confidence interval.
- \times **Empirical Utility Metric:** The upper bound of a (1β) confidence interval for the absolute query error.




Figure: Galton, n = 897 m = 3

- From our theorems: Noise recalibration of the Laplace mechanism ⇒ BDP.
- Substantial utility gains compared to the standard bound.
- More experiments with different real and synthetic datasets in our paper show similar results.



Markov Chain Correlation Model (Theoretical Results)

Main result (Informal)

- Let \mathcal{M} be an ε -DP mechanism,
- input data sampled form Markov chain with transition matrix $P \in \mathbb{R}^{s \times s}$ and initial distribution $w \in \mathbb{R}^{s}$ with the following properties:

(H1) For all
$$x, y \in \mathcal{S}$$
 we have $P_{x,y} > 0$ and, (H2) $wP = w$.

Then,
$$\mathcal{M}$$
 is an $(\varepsilon + 4 \ln \gamma)$ -BDP mechanism where $\gamma = \frac{\max_{x,y \in \mathcal{S}} P_{xy}}{\min_{x,y \in \mathcal{S}} P_{xy}}$.



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
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
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
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Previous mechanism	Ours
$P_{xy} > 0$	$P_{xy} > 0$
stationary	stationary
lazy	
binary	
symmetric	
$arepsilon' > {f 0}$	$arepsilon' > 4 \ln(\gamma)$



Markov Chain Correlation Model (Impact on Real Databases)





- From our theorems: Noise recalibration of the Laplace mechanism ⇒ BDP.
- Substantial utility gains compared to the standard bound.
- Markov bound independent of n
 ⇒ huge improvement for large datasets.



■ We provide a close and computationally feasible method to generate a BDP mechanism by recalibrating existing DP methods.



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Key takeaway:

BDP becomes practical and more accurate when correlations are structured, e.g., small groups, weak Gaussian correlations, or time-series data.



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Key takeaway:

BDP becomes practical and more accurate when correlations are structured, e.g., small groups, weak Gaussian correlations, or time-series data.

■ This enables safe reuse of DP mechanisms in real-world. correlated scenarios without weakening privacy guarantees.



Paper



Code



Backup Slides



Experiment Details

Database	n	m	Parameters	Sensitivity
Galton	897	3	$\rho = 0.275$	$\Delta q = 254$ cm
FamilyIQ	868	2	$\rho = 0.4483$	$\Delta q = 120$
SyntheticIQ	20000	2	$\rho = 0.45$	$\Delta q = 120$
Activity	17568	n	$\gamma = 7.54$	$\Delta q = 1$
Activity Single Day	288	n	$\gamma = 7.54$	$\Delta q = 1$
Electricity	731	n	70 kWh, $\gamma = 3.29$ 80 kWh, $\gamma = 4.49$ 90 kWh, $\gamma = 8.43$	$\Delta q = 1$

Table: Data description. m is the max number of correlated records and n the total amount.

Multivariate Gaussian More Results




Figure: Gaussian data results. Lines show theoretical error at $\beta = 5\%$ and markers indicate empirical 95% upper bounds.